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Foreword | Compared with large 
organisations, small businesses operate in 
a distinct and highly resource-constrained 
operating and technical environment.  
Their proprietors are often time poor, have 
minimal bargaining power and have limited 
financial, technical, legal and personnel 
resources. It is therefore unsurprising that 
cloud computing and its promise of 
smoothing cash flows and dramatically 
reducing ICT overheads is attractive to 
small business. Cloud computing shifts  
the delivery and maintenance of software, 
databases and storage to the internet, 
transforming them into Pay-As-You-Go 
services accessed through a web browser. 
While providing many benefits, cloud 
computing also brings many risks for small 
business, including potential computer 
security and criminal, regulatory and civil 
liability issues. This paper, undertaken as  
a collaborative partnership with the ARC 
Centre of Excellence in Policing and 
Security at Griffith University, identifies 
these risks and offers a perspective on 
how they might be contained so that the 
benefits of cloud computing do not 
outweigh the risks for small businesses in 
the 21st century.
Adam Tomison 
Director
Cloud computing refers to the delivery of computer processing infrastructure, operating 
systems, software and data storage over Internet-based public or private computer 
networks. The aim is to relieve users of some of the burdens associated with maintaining 
computers and data storage, while enabling the associated costs to be reduced. Although 
cloud computing is still developing in popularity and coverage, its use raises a number of 
crime and security concerns, particularly for small business users. This paper charts the 
nature of these concerns for small business and reviews the detection, prevention and 
mitigation measures that may be implemented by small business users and cloud service 
providers to minimise or negate the risks identified.
The small business computing environment
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2001) defines a small business as one employing fewer 
than 20 people and includes sole proprietorships as well as partnerships without employees. 
As at June 2011, small businesses represented 96 percent of businesses in Australia (ABS 
2012). Small business suffers from what Welsh and White (1981: 32) describe as ‘resource 
poverty’ compared with larger organisations. This includes limited in-house specialist technical 
and/or legal knowledge necessary to evaluate and capture the benefits of new operational 
services and technologies. It is also a very time-constrained working environment, where 
personnel frequently work overtime in order to complete necessary tasks. Small business has 
limited access to financial resources and inconsistent cash flow, as well as limited bargaining 
power. Arguably, there is a need for greater tolerance to risk, with many Australian small 
businesses experiencing low survival rates—in any one year, more than 15 percent of all small 
businesses can be expected to fail (DIISR 2011).
Australia’s national research and knowledge centre on crime and justice
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In relation to information and communications 
technologies (ICT), small businesses 
may seek to save costs by using laptop 
computers, tablet devices and mobile 
phones for both business and personal use. 
ICT is also often shared among personnel 
and small businesses are more likely to have 
poorly setup and maintained firewalls, virus 
protection and other security software than 
their larger counterparts.
Small businesses face a number of 
computer security threats and may lack 
the time and/or technical resources to 
install software updates and patches to 
fix software and security bugs or address 
wireless network security, rendering 
them vulnerable to network exploitation 
(Hutchings 2012). Finally, small businesses 
are always on the lookout for new tools 
and are willing to adopt alternative software 
applications. These aspects all create 
vulnerabilities in terms of computer security 
and safety.
One solution that is gradually being 
adopted by small business is to make 
use of so-called ‘cloud computing’. Cloud 
computing includes the delivery of computer 
processing infrastructure (Infrastructure 
as a Service—IaaS), operating system 
platforms (Platform as a Service—PaaS) 
and/or software, databases and storage 
as a service (Software as a Service—SaaS) 
on demand over either a public or private 
computer network (Mell & Grance 2011). 
The range of cloud computing services 
(including some that are provided free of 
charge) that meet the particular needs of 
small business is vast and growing rapidly.
There are many benefits to be derived 
from cloud computing for small business 
including improvements in cash flow, 
reduced administrative and personnel 
overheads, more efficient setup and 
maintenance of ICT, and improvements 
in computer security, particularly with 
respect to the secure storage of sensitive 
information (Mowbray 2009). Finally, cloud 
services replace the need for frequent 
software installation and updates, and  
their accompanying service downtime.
While cloud computing holds great promise 
for small business, it does not completely 
remove all ICT overheads. Small businesses 
remain tasked with engaging other 
subscription services, such as an Internet 
Service Provider. There are also hardware-
related costs including:
•	 purchasing and setting up a modem 
(ADSL, cable, mobile broadband) to 
securely connect to the internet via an 
Internet Service Provider (and where 
appropriate, establishing a secure wireless 
local network); and
•	 purchasing and setting up computer(s), 
printer(s), backup storage etc.
Businesses also need to purchase, set up 
and maintain operating system software, 
security software (eg firewall, anti-virus etc) 
and other software (eg web browsers).
A number of specific crime risks have 
been identified in the literature that could 
affect cloud service providers, cloud 
computing tenants and the transmission 
of data between providers and tenants 
in the small business environment. Many 
of these vulnerabilities are not unique 
to cloud computing, but could arise in 
connection with conventional use of ICT 
by small businesses and indeed, by larger 
businesses as well. What is different, 
however, is the nature of the data that may 
be stored by small businesses on the cloud 
and its attractiveness to offenders located 
in disparate countries. Other vulnerabilities 
are unique to virtualisation and the multi-
tenancy environment of the public cloud.
Methods and aims
This paper presents the findings of a desk-
based assessment of English-language, 
public source literature available over the 
internet and through subscription-based 
services to identify current and emerging 
cloud computing risks and incidents 
relevant to small businesses. The research 
was commissioned by the Department 
of Broadband, Communication and the 
Digital Economy and undertaken by staff 
of the ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing 
and Security and the Australian Institute 
of Criminology. While the commissioned 
research had a wider scope, this paper 
focuses on the crime and security risks that 
small businesses could face through the 
adoption of cloud computing and how they 
might be minimised.
Crime and security  
risks in the cloud
Compared with computer security incidents 
affecting corporate systems generally, there 
have been relatively few attacks reported 
against cloud service providers. Banham 
(2012) claims that this is because cloud 
service providers have stronger security, 
as they are more concerned about the 
consequences of reputational damage if 
data are breached. However, according to 
Pacella (2011: 70), ‘cloud providers often 
ask their clients to keep attacks quiet’. 
When not bound by mandatory data breach 
reporting requirements, as in Australia, 
cloud computing tenants are likely to want 
to avoid the publicity associated with data 
breaches. This may be particularly relevant 
where the cloud service provider claims no 
responsibility or liability for breaches of data 
security or unavailability of data in service-
level agreements (Blumenthal 2011). In 
addition, some attacks may go undetected 
and in other cases when data breaches 
are made public, the fact that data were 
held in the cloud may not be released. It 
is clear that cloud service providers and 
vendors are reluctant to publicise the 
insecurity of their systems and are unwilling 
to disclose security breaches that occur. 
However, recent survey research involving 
cloud tenants, cloud service providers and 
those who attempt to breach systems has 
revealed concerning evidence and actual 
victimisation in connection with cloud 
computing.
Aleem and Sprott (2013) interviewed 200 
ICT professionals worldwide. Respondents’ 
most cited concern regarding the use of 
cloud computing was security, as reported 
by 93.4 percent of interviewees. This was 
considered to be more of a concern than 
governance (62.3%) and the lack of control 
over service availability (55.7%). Cloud 
computing had been implemented by 17 
percent of respondents’ organisations and 
eight percent of respondents reported that 
they had experienced a security breach in 
the cloud. Respondents reported that the 
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top two cloud threats were data loss and 
leakage (73.5%), and account, service and 
traffic hijacking (60.8%).
According to an international survey of 1,200 
companies with over 500 employees in the 
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Japan and India conducted 
by Trend Micro (2011), an antivirus and 
computer security vendor, 43 percent of 
organisations that reported using cloud 
computing had experienced a ‘security lapse 
or issue’ in the previous 12 months, although 
the nature of the incident was not disclosed.
Another survey of 103 US and 24 European 
cloud service providers by the Ponemon 
Institute (2011) revealed that 62 percent 
were not confident that the cloud 
applications and resources they supply are 
secure. Sixty-five percent of respondents 
were public cloud providers, while private 
and hybrid cloud providers comprised  
18 percent of the sample each. Of the 
public cloud providers, only 29 percent  
were confident or very confident that the 
cloud applications and resources supplied 
by their organisation were secure.
A survey of 100 ICT professionals conducted 
by a computer security vendor at DefCon 
(a hacker conference held in Las Vegas in 
2010) found that 96 percent of respondents 
believed that the ‘cloud would open up 
more hacking opportunities for them’ and 
45 percent had ‘already tried to exploit 
vulnerabilities in the cloud’ (Fortify 2010: 7).
In the absence of empirical research into 
the extent of these risks, it is not known at 
present which are more prevalent or more 
important than others.
Crime and security risks involving 
cloud service providers
Examples of the crime and security risks 
that face cloud service providers are as 
follows.
Authentication issues
Unauthorised access to cloud computing 
systems may occur when a username and 
password combination has been obtained 
without authorisation. This can occur using 
a variety of technical and non-technical 
methods. Social engineering may be targeted 
towards the cloud service provider by, for 
example, claiming that urgent access is 
required but that the password is not working 
and needs to be reset. Passwords may also 
be guessed, be left lying around in offices, 
obtained using keylogging malware, cracked 
using brute force, or overcome when there 
are weak password recovery mechanisms, 
such as answering ‘secret’ questions where 
the answers are publicly available (Dlodlo 
2011). An example of a social engineering 
attack is provided in Box 1.
Inadequate authentication checks may 
not necessarily be attributed to malicious 
activity, although they may result in data 
being accessed for nefarious purposes. For 
example, some incidents in which others are 
permitted to have access to data stored on 
the cloud may be inadvertent:
In June 2011, Dropbox, a popular cloud 
storage site where approximately 25 
million people store their videos, photos, 
documents, and other files, inadvertently 
left the site open for four hours on 
Father’s Day. The glitch let anyone log 
in to customers’ accounts with any 
password (Wright 2011: 20).
Insufficient or faulty authentication checks 
may also provide opportunities for 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) guessing 
attacks, whereby possible page links are 
entered to gain access to pages directly, 
bypassing authentication checks (Grobauer, 
Walloschek & Stoecker 2011). Data 
breaches, however they are accomplished, 
may have significant impact not only on the 
cloud service provider’s tenant, whose data 
have been accessed, but also on customers 
who may have trusted that organisation with 
their personal information:
In early April, Epsilon announced 
that its database had been breached 
by an unknown third party, allowing 
unauthorised access to the email 
addresses of its clients’ customers 
(Kunick 2011: 18).
Denial of service attacks
Denial of service (DoS) attacks against cloud 
service providers may leave tenants without 
access to their accounts. This can occur 
by sending a flood of traffic to overwhelm 
websites to make them inaccessible to 
legitimate users. When a DoS attack is 
conducted using a botnet (a network of 
compromised machines), this is referred 
to as a distributed denial of service attack, 
or DDoS. DoS attacks aimed at individual 
accounts, rather than at all cloud tenants, 
may also be accomplished by changing the 
tenant’s password or maliciously continuing 
to enter the incorrect password so that the 
account becomes locked.
Use of cloud computing for criminal 
activities
Cloud computing accounts can be created or 
existing accounts compromised for criminal 
purposes. New cloud computing accounts 
may be created with stolen credentials and 
credit card details, thereby reducing the cost 
to the offender(s), as well as anonymising 
Box 1 Social engineering attack
zzzreyes writes:
I got an email from my cloud server to reset the admin password, first dismissed  
it as phishing, but a few emails later I found one from an admin telling me that  
they had given a person full access to my server and revoked it, but not before  
2 domains were moved from my account. I logged into my account to review the 
activity and found the form the perpetrator had submitted for appointment of new 
primary contact and it infuriated me, given the grave omissions. I wrote a letter to 
the company hoping for them to rectify the harm and they offered me half month of 
hosting, in a sign of good faith. For weeks I’ve been struggling with this and figure 
that the best thing to do is to ask my community for advice and help, so my dear 
slashdotters please share with me if you have any experience with this or know of 
anyone that has gone through this. What can I do?
Source: http://it.slashdot.org/story/12/04/04/1738220/ask-slashdot-my-host-gave-a-
strangeraccess-to-my-cloud-server-what-can-i-do?utm_source=rss1.0moreanon&utm_
medium=feed
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the offender and creating further difficulties 
in tracking down the source of the attack, 
particularly when jurisdictions are crossed. 
Accounts created or compromised in such 
a way can be controlled as part of a botnet. 
In the following example, an existing cloud 
computing account was compromised and 
used to run a botnet command and control 
server:
Computer World UK reported in 
December 2009 that a website hosted 
on Amazon EC2 had been hacked to 
run the Zeus botnet’s command-and-
control infrastructure (Blanton & Schiller 
2010: np).
Botnet command and control servers can 
be used to launch DDoS attacks, conduct 
scams such as click fraud and distribute 
spam. The processing power of botnets 
may also be used to conduct brute force 
attacks to overcome password restrictions. 
For example, there have been reports that 
hackers made use of a cloud computing 
server to launch attacks on Sony’s payment 
platforms in April 2011. This attack resulted 
in the breach of the personal data (including 
name, date of birth and email address) of 
77 million users across the globe and it was 
believed that the data of around 11 million 
credit cards may also have been leaked 
(Hong Kong Government News 2011).
Cloud computing services may be used 
for the storage, distribution and mining 
of criminal data such as stolen personal 
information or child exploitation material 
(Cloud Security Alliance 2010). Accounting 
systems run in the cloud may be attractive 
for money laundering and terrorism financing 
activities. The use of cloud computing to 
conduct illegal activities has had further 
negative consequences in relation to data 
access for other legitimate users of the 
cloud service provider when servers have 
been seized by a law enforcement agency. 
Not only may access be disrupted, but the 
law enforcement agency (international or 
domestic) may have access to that data in a 
multi-tenanted environment (Allen 2010).
Illegal activity by cloud service providers
Loss of access to data has also occurred 
when cloud service providers themselves 
have allegedly engaged in illegal behaviour. 
In one case, the cloud service provider’s 
services were stopped due to police 
action. Kim Dotcom and his colleagues 
were arrested following allegations the 
Megaupload cloud storage service he 
conducted involved illegal piracy. While the 
service had allegedly been used to swap 
movies and music files, Megaupload was 
also a low-cost way of legitimately sharing 
files and making online backups. When the 
US authorities closed the service without 
warning, businesses were unable to access 
their documents (Bennett 2012).
Attacks on physical security
Cloud service providers’ data centres may 
also be physically attacked, resulting in 
hardware theft, unauthorised access to 
servers or loss of access to data. In one 
case in the United States, two masked 
men allegedly pistol-whipped a lone staff 
member during a graveyard shift, holding 
the worker hostage for two hours while 
confiscating equipment in a Chicago data 
centre. The burglars reportedly entered the 
facility through a fire escape, swiped the 
staffer’s access card through a reader and 
forced him to perform a fingerprint scan 
before stealing computer storage equipment 
(Knapp, Denney & Barner 2011).
Insider abuse of access
Cloud service provider insiders, such as 
employees, contractors or third party 
suppliers, may misuse their privileges to 
disrupt access or to obtain unauthorised 
access to stored data. Insiders may obtain 
employment at a targeted cloud service 
provider, be targeted by organised crime 
syndicates, abuse their access as the result 
of becoming discontent in their employment, 
or become tempted by presented 
opportunities and the potential perceived 
gains (Blumenthal 2011). Over half (52.9%) 
of the ICT professionals surveyed by Aleem 
and Sprott (2013) indicated that they were 
concerned about insider threats in the cloud.
Malware
The cloud service providers’ servers may be 
vulnerable to malware infection, including 
virtual machine-based rootkits (Aron 2011). 
These risks apply in non-cloud environments 
as well. Malware infection may result in 
account names and passwords being 
compromised, files being accessed and 
copied, corruption of files or being added 
to a botnet. There is also the possibility that 
malware compromising one tenant’s virtual 
machines could then spread to the virtual 
machines of other tenants.
Side channel attacks or cross-guest 
virtual machine breaches
‘Side channel attacks’ or ‘cross-guest 
virtual machine breaches’ may result in 
tenants crossing the shared virtual machine 
boundaries and accessing the data of other 
tenants using shared physical resources. 
Side channel attacks require the attacker’s 
virtual machine and victim’s virtual machine 
to be located on the same physical 
machine; therefore, these attacks may be 
random and not targeted towards a specific 
tenant. However, targeted attacks may still 
be possible. It has been demonstrated with 
one cloud computing service provider that 
co-tenancy could be successfully achieved 
40 percent of the time by setting up new 
accounts while simultaneously manipulating 
the resource needs of the targeted victim’s 
virtual machines (Ristenpart et al. 2009).
Vulnerabilities in shared technology 
resources, which is the environment where 
side channel attacks occur, was listed as 
one of the top cloud threats by 37.3 percent 
of the ICT professionals surveyed by Aleem 
and Sprott (2013).
Vulnerabilities in software applications
Security holes and vulnerabilities may exist 
in software applications run in the cloud, 
such as backdoors that bypass normal 
authentication protocols (Pacella 2011). 
New vulnerabilities for operating systems, 
internet browsers and business applications 
are regularly being identified. Security 
patches fix vulnerabilities in computer 
programs, which may be used to gain 
unauthorised access. However, delays in 
installing patches may lead to increased 
exploitation attempts as the vulnerabilities 
they are fixing are then made known.
Similarly, insecure application programming 
interfaces, which allow software applications 
to interoperate with each other by passing 
login information between them, may 
provide another attack vector. Of the ICT 
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professionals surveyed by Aleem and Sprott 
(2013), 39.2 percent indicated that insecure 
application programming interfaces were 
among the top cloud threats.
Web browsers, used to access the internet 
and cloud service providers, are another 
type of software application that may be 
subject to attack. Browser vulnerabilities 
include cross site scripting whereby code is 
injected into websites and executed by the 
browser (Dlodlo 2011). Cross site scripting 
can be used to hijack sessions by obtaining 
cookies or authentication credentials by 
redirecting users to a site impersonating the 
cloud service provider.
Cryptanalysis of insecure or obsolete 
encryption
Data stored in the cloud may be encrypted 
to prevent it from being read if accessed 
without authorisation. However, encryption 
can potentially be weakened or broken if 
insecure or obsolete (Grobauer, Walloschek 
& Stoecker 2011). Partial information can 
also be obtained from encrypted data by 
monitoring clients’ query access patterns 
and analysing accessed positions (Agrawal, 
El Abbadi & Wang 2011).
Structured Query Language injection
Structured Query Language (SQL) is a 
programming language used for database 
management systems. SQL injection 
attacks targeting web entry forms involve 
inputting SQL code that is erroneously 
executed in the database back end (Dlodlo 
2011). SQL injection attacks can result in 
data being accessed and modified without 
authorisation. Another injection attack is OS 
injection or command injection, whereby 
the input contains commands that are 
erroneously executed by the operating 
system (Grobauer, Walloschek & Stoecker 
2011).
Crime and security risks targeting 
cloud computing tenants
Phishing
Although, in the context of cloud computing, 
phishing misrepresents the provider, the 
attack is directed towards those who may 
hold an account with that organisation 
with the aim of obtaining passwords and 
other identifying information to obtain 
unauthorised access to data held in the 
cloud (Dlodlo 2011). Phishing is one 
example of social engineering in which an 
email appearing to be from a legitimate 
organisation is sent directing recipients to a 
bogus (spoofed) website to enter their login 
credentials or other personal information.
Domain name system attacks
Cloud computing users may be subject to 
domain name system (DNS) attacks. The 
principal use of domain names is to convert 
an internet protocol resource (a string of 
numbers) into a readily identifiable and 
memorable address, such as those used 
in email addresses and URLs. A variety 
of DNS attacks are aimed at obtaining 
authentication credentials from internet 
users, including cloud service tenants. 
Pharming and DNS-poisoning involve 
diverting visitors to spoofed websites by 
‘poisoning’ the DNS server or the DNS 
cache on the user’s computer. Domain 
hijacking refers to stealing a cloud service 
provider’s domain name, while domain 
sniping involves registering an elapsed 
domain name. Cybersquatting refers to 
registering a domain name that appears 
to be similar to a cloud service provider, 
which can be used to conduct phishing 
scams. Login details can also be obtained 
by typesquatting, which relies on a user 
entering the wrong URL and subsequently 
providing their authentication credentials to 
a spoofed website.
Compromising the device accessing the 
cloud
Access to a business’s cloud computing 
account may be achieved if the device 
accessing the cloud service is compromised, 
for example, by a keylogger that records 
keystrokes including usernames and 
passwords (Banks 2010). Again, malware 
infections such as this may be random, or 
individuals within an organisation may be 
directly targeted with a Trojan—malware 
designed to look like a legitimate file.
Access management issues
Businesses that fail to restrict their 
employees’ access to cloud computing 
services after they leave their employment 
would be vulnerable to having their data 
accessed, altered, copied, or deleted 
(Subashini & Kavitha 2011). Former 
employees may seek revenge against their 
employer, or steal information for resale or 
to use in setting up a competing business. 
Such risks, of course, also exist in the non-
cloud computing environment.
Attacks targeting the  
transmission of data
Session hijacking and session riding
Session hijacking involves the attacker 
exploiting active computer sessions by 
obtaining the cookies that are used to 
authenticate users. This can be achieved by 
cross site scripting, which involves malicious 
code being injected into the website, which 
is subsequently executed by the browser 
(Dlodlo 2011).
A similar attack called session riding, is 
where websites are exploited using cross 
site request forgery to transmit unauthorised 
commands. An attacker ‘rides’ an active 
computer session by tricking a user (eg by 
sending a link) into visiting a manipulated 
webpage while they are logged into the 
targeted site. The webpage contains a 
request that is executed by the website as 
the user is also sending their authentication 
credentials. Commands may be used to, 
for example, manipulate or delete data, 
reset passwords, add new users or delete 
existing users, or forward emails (Schreiber 
2004).
Man-in-the-middle attacks
In a man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker 
intercepts traffic between a website and a 
Browser (Grobauer, Walloschek & Stoecker 
2011). This occurs when the browser 
believes that the attacker is the legitimate 
website and the website authenticates 
the attacker as the browser. The attacker 
can then read and alter the data being 
transmitted, including account passwords 
that may be used to login to cloud services.
Network/packet sniffing
Network or packet sniffing involves the 
interception and monitoring of network 
traffic (Subashini & Kavitha 2011). Data that 
are being transmitted across a network, 
such as passwords, can therefore be 
captured and read if not adequately 
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encrypted. In the cloud environment, this 
is particularly important as passwords play 
a critical role in establishing access to the 
provider’s services.
Responding to crime and 
security threats facing small 
business
Although the threats identified above 
may seem somewhat oppressive, there 
are a number of measures that can be 
adopted by small businesses as well as 
cloud providers to detect, prevent and 
minimise the damage from criminal and 
security threats in the cloud environment. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the various 
methods that are available both to business 
tenants and cloud computing providers.
Arguably, a single measure can be used 
to address multiple threats. While the 
implementation of some measures resides 
with cloud service providers, such as 
physical security of data warehouses, 
others can be undertaken by small business 
proprietors themselves, particularly when 
they select a provider and assess the 
nature of the services they offer. Assessing 
considerations such as whether data 
travelling between the cloud and the 
browser are encrypted, whether multi-factor 
authentication is offered and the physical 
security of the data warehouse are all of 
critical importance.
Technical prevention measures
Technical prevention measures can be 
adopted by both the small business and 
the cloud service provider. These include 
patching operating systems, internet 
browsers and other software applications 
to protect against new vulnerabilities and 
malware, installing anti-virus and malware 
tools, and installing firewalls to protect 
against unauthorised access. Cloud 
computing providers may also implement 
multifactor authentication to strengthen 
authentication checks. Encrypting data 
travelling between the cloud and the 
browser, as well as encrypting data stored in 
the cloud, protects against attacks targeting 
the transmission of data, as well as limiting 
the effects of unauthorised access. Cloud 
Table 1 Summary of cloud computing crime and security prevention measures
Technical prevention measures Physical security
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service providers may also use intrusion 
detection and prevention systems and 
network monitoring.
Physical security
Cloud service providers should, arguably, 
provide a safe and secure data warehouse 
that can only be accessed by authorised 
personnel in order to prevent attacks 
against physical infrastructure, as well as 
insider abuse of access. Physical security 
measures include:
•	 perimeter security, such as bunkers, gates 
and fences;
•	 shielded server rooms and cages that 
prevent eavesdropping, external scanning 
and interference via electromagnetic 
radiation;
•	 surveillance, such as CCTV and security 
guards;
•	 access control, such as swipe cards, 
turnstiles, biometric authentication and 
identity cards; and
•	 maintaining facility access logs.
Cloud service providers should also have 
effective fire management practices in place 
and backup power systems to prevent data 
loss through natural disaster or malicious 
attacks. While security audits should assess 
whether appropriate physical security 
measures are in place, audit rights may be 
beyond the scope of small businesses.
Organisational policies,  
awareness and training
Small businesses may implement a number 
of organisational policies to protect against 
computer security threats that relate to 
cloud computing, as well as computer 
security more generally. These include ICT-
acceptable use policies that set out how 
a business’s computer resources should 
be used, including expectations in relation 
to personal use, the handling of sensitive 
information, the installation of applications 
and the forwarding of emails, which may 
contain malware.
Password policies set out how often 
passwords should be changed and their 
complexity to strengthen authentication 
checks, while user access management 
policies set out the access rights for 
staff, including that access should be 
discontinued when a staff member leaves 
an organisation. Employees using their 
own devices into the workplace should 
also be subject to organisational policies, 
as they may be vulnerable to compromise 
and create more avenues for unauthorised 
access to cloud services.
Small businesses may also provide training 
to staff and create awareness about 
computer security issues. Ensuring staff 
are well informed may assist in preventing 
social engineering attacks, such as phishing 
that are not necessarily protected against 
by technical measures. Because of the 
sensitive nature of data stored by cloud 
service providers, they should also conduct 
background checks when employing staff 
as a preventative measure against insider 
abuse of access.
The AIC’s Australian Business Assessment 
of Computer User Security (ABACUS) 
revealed that small business respondents 
were less likely than medium and large 
businesses to have staff policies or training 
in place. Only seven percent had ICT-
acceptable use policies, 19 percent had 
account/password management policies, 
12 percent had user access management 
policies and 15 percent provided employee 
education and awareness programs 
(Richards 2009).
Service level agreements
Small businesses should be aware of the 
implications of their cloud service provider’s 
service level agreement, which will address 
the issues of security, privacy and data 
control. Service level agreements may also 
set out requirements for third party audits of 
cloud service providers.
Cyber and cloud insurance
Existing cyber liability insurance holds 
out some limited hope of compensating 
for losses as a result of cybercrime. 
However, the best hope for broader 
coverage rests with contingent business 
interruption insurance adapted to the 
unique circumstances of cloud computing 
(‘cloud insurance’) being developed by new 
entrepreneurial ventures.
Crime displacement risks
Crime displacement occurs when crime 
moves to other locations, times, targets, 
methods, perpetrators, or types of offence, 
often as the result of crime prevention 
initiatives. Displacement concerns that relate 
to cloud computing may include:
•	 displacement to cloud service providers 
who do not have strong security measures;
•	 cloud service providers operating from 
jurisdictions that do not have applicable 
criminal provisions, have low criminal 
penalties, or do not have extradition 
treaties;
•	 different methods, for example, if a target 
is adequately protected against electronic 
attacks, an offender may coerce an 
employee through bribery or extortion; and
•	 displacement to perpetrators who are 
more highly skilled and perhaps more 
adept at hiding their offending activities.
Effective crime prevention requires an 
appreciation of these risks and the use  
of measures designed to address them.
Conclusions
Compared with larger organisations, 
small business operates in a distinctive, 
highly resource constrained environment, 
rendering the promise of cloud computing 
to smooth cash flows and reduce ICT 
overhead highly attractive. However, in 
adopting cloud computing, it is this distinct 
operating environment that also renders 
small businesses vulnerable to criminal and 
security threats. 
In relation to cybercrime risks, while cloud 
service providers themselves hold much 
greater appeal to cybercriminals, it is the 
cloud service provider’s small business 
tenants—who experience disrupted services 
and hence disruption to their already 
fragile revenues—that are likely to be the 
real victims. Lacking policies, procedures 
and training relating to cyber and network 
security, small businesses are particularly 
vulnerable to having account details stolen 
and their cloud services hijacked. There are, 
however, technical and commercial practices 
that can be implemented to reduce at least 
some of the security and crime risks. In the 
words of Mowbray (2009: 14): 
[I]t is likely that a combination of 
technical solutions, business practices, 
and standard contracts between [cloud 
service providers] and customers will 
be able to resolve most if not all [cloud 
computing concerns].
In addition, cyber liability insurance may 
be able to compensate small businesses 
for losses as a result of cybercrime 
in the cloud. Creating a secure cloud 
computing environment may serve to 
place small business on substantially 
the same footing as larger businesses, 
enabling them to fully capture the true 
benefits of cloud computing while 
enduring a more equitable share of the 
risks.
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